Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr.

Lantos, Members of the Committee.

Mr. Lantos, I will be pleased to relay your compliments to the

Secretary when she gets back later this week.

As all the statements suggested, I know there is extremely

strong interest in this Committee, as there is across the United

States, in the problems of Sudan and Darfur.

Mr. Chairman, just to underscore one of the points you made in

the opening comment, I have discussed this with the President, as

well as the Secretary of State at length. Both of them are extremely

interested in the issue. It is one of the reasons that they

asked me to focus on Darfur and the issues of Sudan. I will discuss

some of this in the PowerPoint testimony. I tried to present this

in this format because sometimes I think it is a little bit more userfriendly.

But I will try to move through it quickly so we have plenty

of chances to get through questions.

The second slide is just a map. It is a good reference point.

But, on page 3, you see, I have tried to identify the goals of

United States policy, because I think it is very important, amidst

all the challenges, that one has a clear sense of what one is trying

to achieve, and that is a unified and peaceful Sudan that contributes

to regional development and cooperates on counterterrorism;

a participatory and inclusive democratic government in a Federal

system that respects human rights, shares resources for the benefit

of all Sudanese, and a key aspect of that are free, fair and democratic

elections at the local, regional and national levels within 4 years.

To make this happen, we have to have an end to violence in

Darfur, reconciliation among tribal and other groups, the voluntary

return of people to their homes and, of course, accountability for the perpetrators.

In the meantime, I will come back to some of the particulars on

this, we have to make sure we provide the humanitarian care and

security for the internally displaced people and other civilians in

Darfur, as well as the refugees in Chad, and try to improve conditions in South Sudan.

I want to focus on economic development and effective integration

of all areas of Sudan and to the global economy; thereby ending

one of the problems for Sudan, which has been a recurring

cycle of famine and suffering leading to cross-border violence, as

well as some of the points that Mr. Rohrabacher is referencing, and the refugee flows.

In the process, we want to try to strengthen the African Union’s

capacity to provide basic security, ensure humanitarian access, mediate

political conflicts, trying to demonstrate a success in Darfur

and all of Sudan, and, in the process, also demonstrate strong

United States support for Africa’s peaceful development and democracy.

The next slide, page 4, tries to give a quick sense of background

and context. Because, as I know many of you that have visited and

talked to others and me about this, is that there are a number of

complex strands here coming together, and I just thought it would

be useful to try to highlight some of them. Most important is that

Sudan as a country has been marked by ethno-religious

exclusivism since the Khartoum traders and mercenaries first

carved out this region in the conquest of the Nile Valley in the 19th century.

So, historically, you have a country that has been dominated by

a very small clique of traders, soldiers, and administrators. They

tend to be drawn from a limited set of tribes, frankly three Arab

tribes north of Khartoum. Because of this, the country at large has

had a large Arab cultural-religious orientation. The ties are traditionally

to Cairo, to Damascus in the past years, to Saudi Arabia,

and not to the rest of Africa.

So what that has produced is Khartoum fundamentally operates

as an Arab metropolis that is surrounded by impoverished sub-Saharan expanses.

So in the South, you have traditional African tribal structures,

animist and Christian communities.

In the West, in Darfur, you have had a fascinating historical

mixing over the centuries of African and Arab-Muslim tribes. Some

have come from the West over a long migration, some of them economic,

some of them religious. You have ancient Saharan peoples

and Arab tribes from the North.

Economically, this has led to a mixture. You have nomads and

also farmers, and this creates a very complex network where livelihood

has been based on desert-edge villages, very dependent on

rain and ‘‘boom-and-bust’’ agriculture and grasses. As I will talk

about, this has been one of the precipitators of the problem in the

region. If we are really going to address this problem over time, understanding

some of the economic and ethnic connections will be

important to address.

In the North, you have a mixture of Arab tribes, and they predominate

in the urban areas.

And in the East, you have this general egalitarian pastoral Beja

that have ancestral ties to Egypt and the Nubians.

Now, in the past, and this basically references up to 1989, the

history of the system is a very weak center, Khartoum, that has

tended to co-opt regional constituencies to create a power base,

which is based on this Arab sort of center with the tribes from

north of the Nile.

Just to give you an example, since we focused on Darfur; Darfur

was the Independent Fur Sultanate, so Dar was the land of the

Fur dating back to the 17th century. This was overthrown by the

British at the start of the 20th century, in 1916. The way that the

British then ruled the country was through a series of imperial na-

tive administrations that awarded homelands with paramount

chiefs. This displaced the older, more fluid social order.

Now a key point for today is some of the nomadic groups didn’t

get lands in this process. As I noted, this set a long fuse for the

future when some of those groups ran out of area for their grasses.

The rule depended on the effectiveness of local leadership in government.

This was and remains a very important aspect for tribal

conferences to try to help settle disputes.

Sudan achieved its independence in 1956. As some of you alluded

to, this is the largest country in the continent. It borders nine other

countries. So what happens in Sudan affects a lot of others, it has

an estimated 40 million people.

Now the roots of the conflict date back to this point that I mentioned

about a strong resentment from the periphery of the Muslim-

Arab domination at the center. So the strife really starts with

independence in 1956, when the Southern groups start to struggle

for their potential independence. There is a peace agreement in

1972, and that failed because it was not fully implemented, a caution

for all of us today related to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

we signed earlier this year.

The Government of Sudan (GOS) imposed Shari’a Law in 1983.

This re-triggered the Southern civil war now under the leadership

of Dr. John Garang, a Southerner who had been part of the Sudanese

military, integrated as part of the 1972 peace implementation.

As many of you who know him, he was educated in the United

States, went to Iowa State, as I recall, also had military training

here. An important point, this battle in the South was the first use

by the Government of Sudan of government-mobilized militias as

a counterinsurgency strategy, interestingly and, in some cases, a

tragic irony, drawing on some of the cattle herding areas of Darfur.

It is a basic strategy of brutality, starvation, and robbery. Of

course these tactics, these counterinsurgency tactics, have been

turned against Darfur 20 years later. So in the North-South struggle,

as I think Mr. Lantos and the Chairman mentioned, you had

some 2.5 million people die over the course of this 21-year struggle.

So, meanwhile, in Darfur, in the mid-1980s, this trouble really

starts with the drought and famine in 1984. This led to the breakdown

of this fragile social structure that I mentioned, including the

migratory patterns between the settled agriculturalists and the herders.

An important part, as many of you may recall, Libya, which was

trying to go after Chad in 1987, uses the region as sort of a backdoor

for movement. It formed something called the Arab Legion.

This is very important, because the description I gave you of this

region suggests you had a mixing of Arabs and Africans over centuries

in this region. The sharp borders between Arabs and Africans

had not really been drawn until you start this racial ideology

of Arabism that comes out of the Chad movement. Frankly, this is

connected to some of the definitions of genocide, at least the United

States view of them.

In 1989, General Bashir overthrows the government, establishes

this Revolutionary Command Council for the National Salvation.

The National Islamic Front that is run by Dr. Turabi takes over

as the leading party. You also have economic effort, a terrible

hyperinflation during this period, that wipes out the traditional

middle class. Turabi prosecutes a vicious war in the South. Meanwhile,

he is also trying to use an Islamic embrace on Darfur, but

without any real effects on development.

Just again, to give you a sense of the interconnecting conflicts

here: In 1972, there is a declaration of Jihad in Kordofan against

a group that is associated with the SPLA. That is the Southern

group in the Nuba Mountains. This tries to create an Islamic state

by force, but it fails.

In 1998 the army, the militia, uses starvation efforts in the oilfield

zones of Upper Nile Province in Southern Sudan. This is

against Southern Sudan and a little further north. But, again, the

focus now—and this is understanding the regime—is on money and

power. This is not an Islamic purpose.

In the 1990s, as a number of you mentioned, Turabi hosts Osama

bin Laden. The United States attacks Sudan in August 1998 at a

suspected weapons of mass destruction facility. In 1999, partly precipitated

by this, you have a split within the Islamic movement in

Khartoum, and President Bashir arrests Turabi.

September 11, 2001, the Government of Sudan starts to accelerate

its reorientation toward the United States. This goes back to,

I think, to Mr. Tancredo’s and some of the other points. This clearly

is a recognition of reality. It is not a change of heart. Bashir is

fearful of Sudan’s association with terrorists. The Government of

Sudan cannot defeat Garang and the SPLM militarily. So, in a

sense, you have politics driven by exhaustion. They are worn down

by decades of war, failure of the ambitious, ideological projects.

These are the conditions that led to the negotiation of the North-

South Accord that was signed in January 2005. This accord creates

the possibility of a new pattern of power-sharing among geographically-

defined constituencies and some prospects for development, in

part through energy resources. The government, of course, is looking

toward greater international acceptance.

But outside Khartoum, you have got a potential conflict. You

have got an impulse, on the one hand, for equality and another one

for emancipation. These pull in opposite directions, because the peripheries

have to decide: Should they try to get the strongest possible

representation at the center to overcome the history of Sudan,

or should they try to break away?

Khartoum’s old habits also haven’t changed, a caution that many

of you have made properly. They are fearing separation, but they

also have the tension of negotiated power-sharing. So, in 2002,

some Darfurians were complaining of Arab militia harassment. The

problem festered. What launched the genocide was an early attack

on a police station by some rebel groups in 2003.

So even as Khartoum is negotiating with the South, starting in

2002, it turns to the old habits. It unleashes the Army as well as

a brutal militia counterinsurgency in Darfur.

Again, at least I think there is some thought that what was also

going on in Khartoum is that some were feeling that maybe others

in Khartoum were maybe giving away too much in the North-South

negotiation. So you have the extraordinary tragedy, the large-scale

loss of life, widespread raids and destruction of villages. Over 2

million people forced from their homelands, violence carried out by

government forces, the Arab militia, Janjaweed, and the rebel

groups, the SLA and JEM, which I will come back to, which have

their own internal conflicts.

Some of the Darfur rebels, the SLA, have ties with some of the

rebels, particularly John Garang’s SPLM. These are the larger

groups, the SPLA—the JEM group, just to add to the complexity,

actually have ties with Turabi, the person who was pushed out.

The United States made a finding of genocide again in Darfur in

2004. This is a point I will be happy to come back to.

The UN did not find genocide. They found crimes against humanity

in 2005. Many people will recall—Mr. Lantos made this point—

the Nuremberg Trials were crimes against humanity. The United

States’ position is that it is genocide.

But one point is that, at least in terms of dealing with this internationally,

my own view is, while we are not changing our position

on genocide, crimes against humanity are bad enough for most people

to work on. So rather than get too caught up in the labels, what

we should try to do is focus on the problems here. It is not changing

anything about it. Frankly, I don’t think it is best for us to get

diverted in the fight with the UN whether it is crimes against humanity

or genocide. We have our view. Frankly, it goes back to

some legal questions in international law about whether or not

there are some ethnic issues. Frankly, I believe our position is

right, but the key thing is we have got to focus on solving the problem.

Again, as some people mentioned—Mr. Rohrabacher—when we

look at Sudan as a whole, we focus on the South, we focus on

Darfur. There are other potential problems out there, in the Eastern

and Northern provinces, and we have to be careful as we proceed

and try to prevent a flare-up of violence elsewhere.

Indeed, some of you may have seen, there was a report in the

*Financial Times* this morning about eastern Sudan, where the Beja

people that I referenced took 20 Sudanese soldiers captive. This is,

I expect, one of their moves to try to sort of influence the overall process.

But as we have seen, starting with the attack on the police station

in Darfur in 2002/2003, a little spark with a lot of wood could

lead to big flare-ups.

As a number of you also mentioned, there is a very strong African

interest as a whole. You have got the largest country in Africa.

It has got nine neighbors. They are Arabic. They are African.

Frankly, it is not only the worry about the spillover, but it is the

worry that all of Africa is basically divided on old colonial lines and

the worry about the break-up of states. Also, the African Union is

in a process of trying to strenthen its ability to try to deal with African problems.

So a quick run through.

Now, turning to page 10, the North-South Accord, just to get to

the baseline. This agreement was begun in negotiations in 2002,

signed in January 2005. This is the one that Senator Danforth

played an important leadership role in. It is a fair political arrangement,

based on this changed concept of power and wealth

starting to lead to national elections in 4 years. It has got very,

very detailed implementation requirements. I emphasize that be-

cause we have an agreement; it is starting, but there is a tremendous

amount to do in order to make this work.

I highlighted some of the key ones: Commitments to develop an

interim Constitution, which is going on right now; a bicameral national

legislature; process for competitive elections; a new institution

of the Presidency that would draw the Southerners in with the

Khartoum Government; allocation of ministerial posts in this new

Government of National Unity; oil revenue sharing; joint integrated

military units; human rights provisions.

We are now in what is called the Pre-Interim Period. This is supposed

to be completed by July 9th, at which time the North and

the South are supposed to create a Government of National Unity.

Dr. Garang actually becomes the first Vice President in this new

government.

One of the things we have been pressing for is to move that process

forward, and then that triggers a 6-Year Interim Period. Part

of the South’s ongoing leverage is they have the ability to opt out

of this process at the end of the 6-Year Interim Period.

Now, the next page, 11—and a number of you referenced this—

CPA and Darfur. And as the Chairman put it, you could add the

terrorism element here. It is the challenge of trying to reinforce upward

spirals or arresting downward spirals. So the CPA creates a

political and, indeed, fundamental constitutional framework for trying

to share authority and wealth, which does create the possibility

of ending the conflicts, not only in the South but in Darfur and the

potential ones in the East and other regions.

Garang and his group, the SPLM’s involvement with the new

Government of National Unity, should help resolve Darfur. Garang

has made the point that the government shouldn’t spend $1—he

used the local currency—in terms of the fighting in Darfur.

Also, an important signal, the backing by the U.S., substantially

with the Congress, has helped, including financial resources and

countries around the world for the North-South Accord. This creates

a positive incentive for others to try to come to terms within

this potential political framework. So the potential upward spiral

is the CPA implementation, a new Sudanese Government approach,

an expanded African Union mission on the ground, focusing

also on reconciliation in Darfur and other areas, within this political framework.

But there is the potential downward spiral, and a point that I

and others have emphasized, which is that if we have an ongoing

tragedy in Darfur, this will preclude United States support for the

new government and the CPA implementation. So what could be

coming together could drag the process down.

On page 12, I just tried to identify some of Darfur’s key needs.

The first is to try to supply food and basic necessities for the people

forced off the land, an estimated 2 million. Also, and beyond food,

we obviously have to improve the security inside and outside the

camps. You have all read, we have all encountered, the terrible stories

of people not being able to leave the camps, but there is also

a problem in terms of needing to get the African Union police in

the camps to try to protect them.

But, frankly, those two parts aren’t enough. That just stabilizes

the situation at best. One also has to push for a political reconcili-

ation among the government, the rebel groups, and various tribes.

This is one reason I referenced some of the historical aspects. We

are also going to have to give people a chance to return to their

homes, that is, we are going to need to address some of the longterm

economic and social issues.

This has been complicated by the drought that has exacerbated

human needs in the displaced populations. The good news for now

is that the food is flowing, and I want to compliment the people

with USAID and the contractors that have worked with them. They

have done a fantastic job with the NGOs. I know you have had a

chance to visit. I have visited the camps.

Here is a striking fact: 86 percent of the food delivered to Darfur

is from the United States of America. We had the Europeans in

town, and one of the points that the President and I have emphasized

is that they need to upgrade their support for this. Because,

frankly, in the South, we are supplying 90 percent of the food.

We have also focused on the need for the Government of Sudan

and the rebels to halt the harassment of the NGOs. A key component

which many of you referred to is the need to expand the AU

mission. We have just gotten the AU security forces to up to about

2,700. Over the course of this year, we have urged them, they have

agreed, to expand to 7,700.

There is some discussion among the African Union about possibly

going up to a higher number. They have referred to 12,000. But,

frankly, each of these takes work. Frankly, one of the reasons I

was in Rwanda before I was in Darfur and Khartoum the last time

is that Rwanda has good troops. They have been willing to put the

troops in there. We, through U.S. forces and NATO, had to supply

the transport, the logistical planning support. We tended to be

linked up with the Rwandans in doing that. The deployment for

these forces is supposed to begin in the start of July. We are pressing

to try to get it done in the July-September time frame.

I made a reference to police. As many of you know who have

been there, you have military forces. You also have police contingents

coming from a number of African countries. These are very

important because there are some 200 overall camps, but 90 major

camps. We have to get police in those camps to try to protect people.

A modest point, but it gives some sense of how we are trying to

focus on diplomacy, we pressed the Government of Sudan to support

the African Union’s role and NATO’s role, which they did. This

is sovereign territory. If you are going into a sovereign territory

without somebody’s approval, you are declaring war. So it is important

to get somebody to come in and agree to this, and it is an important

step that they agreed.

In part, as some of you have made the point, it is the recognition

of, frankly, the failure of their policy. Their belief that their future

power, holding of power is not a change of stripes, as the Congressman

mentioned. It is clearly their own calculation of what is in

their self-interest, which is why one wants to keep the pressure on.

The United States support, as I mentioned, has been airlift for

Rwandans, as I mentioned. Some of you mentioned the work I have

done in Africa before, if you are going to ask people to do things,

it is nice to go there to thank them and the Rwandans have some

of the best forces.

Going back to Mr. Lantos’ point, I also wanted to make a point,

because I visited the genocide memorial there, which is a very impressive

museum and reminder for all.

With the Congress’ help we were able to allocate some $50 million

quickly, because these troops have to have facilities and a

place to stay. So, frankly, we started to move that money already

to start to get the construction for these quarters; and an important

component since I talked to both the AU and the NATO forces

is a complicated area, the planning and logistics operation, that,

frankly, NATO is best positioned to perform.

Now the Government of Sudan military has pulled back, but you

still have the Janjaweed militias operating. According to the UN

Secretary-General’s report—and this conforms with one I have

seen—there appears to be less violence, but there is increased banditry.

You should know the U.S. headed off some particular individual

conflicts. In other words, with our contacts, we could see forces

massing, whether they were Janjaweed militia or others. I called

Vice President Taha in Khartoum. We contacted the African Union

forces and made the point that additional slaughter would just

make this harder for everybody to try to move ahead.

So, in addition to trying to deal with it at the macro level, I can

assure you we are dealing at some pretty micro-village level here

to try to stop conflict.

An important point that I alluded to is that the rebel groups are

still active. The SLA is the bigger one. They are fighting each other

right now. In fact, part of the violence you see in Darfur is, as we

push the peace reconciliation, the rebels are, not surprisingly, trying

to strengthen their own position relative to one another. So

some of the conflict you have had, has been rebel on rebel. Also,

frankly, the rebels probably associate with some of the bandits trying

to get food from some of the convoys.

An important point here is then how do we try to create a process

for peace or reconciliation? Here, again, the African Union has

been in the lead in peace talks in Abuja, in Nigeria. It is important

for the African Union to play a leadership role, but they need our support.

The key mediator is the former Prime Minister of Tanzania

Salim, who I spoke to in the past week to try to coordinate with,

pledge our support; and in doing so we are obviously trying to work

with some other European countries, other African countries. This

process just restarted again on June 10; and it is fitful, is the best way to say it.

Frankly, this is also where the North-South struggle fits in with

Darfur. Dr. Garang has some influence over the SLA. So when Dr.

Garang was here I emphasized, I hope you emphasized, that we

need his help in terms of solving the Darfur problem.

In March, we were able to get the three UN resolutions on economic

sanctions, on accountability, also one that I will mention in

terms of starting the UN forces in the North and South. The goal

here for Darfur is to try to create a secure environment for the political

and tribal reconciliation so people can return home, and I

emphasize ‘‘voluntarily.’’ Because sometimes there are movements

made but not voluntarily. So food, security, but a peaceful accord will extend.

The followup is disarming the militias, and then recognizing this

problem is not going to stop with that. You still have problems with

restarting life, getting people back to villages and dealing with

some of these long-term issues of land and grazing rights and

water and some of the tribal tensions that exist through that.

Now the follow-through on the CPA, the North-South Accord, I

attended a conference in Oslo to try to emphasize the importance

of it and the commitment for donors to support the North-South

Accord. There were some $4.5 billion in pledges. I have outlined

here some of the U.S. funding, and the U.S. is by far the most generous

player. Obviously, that depends on the support that we get

from the U.S. Congress.

The third UN resolution, 1590, authorized the 10,700 observer

force for Southern Sudan. In addition, there are some civilian

forces. So, again, I know most of you followed this closely. This is

a UN peacekeeping force in the South that is different than the AU

force in the West. This deployment started in May. We are aiming

for completion by December 2005. I got a report this week of some

slowdown because this is the rainy season.

One other item I want to draw to your attention—some of you

may have encountered this group. There is a fantastic small group

of a civilian protection monitoring team, led by some retired U.S.

military officers that operate out of the South. It uses planes to try

to investigate incidents. They have a lot of credibility. They were

scheduled to come out in June. But because the UN forces were a

little longer in coming on—and I saw them when I was in the

South in Rumbek—we were able to extend that, agreeing with the

UN and finding some money to do that.

It is a good example, frankly, of how—as I am sure many of you

know—whether it is NGOs, former military officers, small numbers

of people make a huge difference. And these are very dedicated people.

The food shortage problem, however, is now greater in the South

than it is in Darfur; and this is a point I want to emphasize. Because

if we want to make the North-South Accord work, and if

John Garang wants to stress how this is a new day, it is going to

be hard to do so if people come back and they don’t have food.

Again, we are in a position where the United States has provided

90 percent of the food deliveries. Again, when I was in Rwanda, I

talked about this with Commissioner Michel, one of the European

Union commissioners; and the President and I raised this this

week again with the European Commission and the European—

Luxembourg, the European Chair.

Another point that I want to mention, because I know some of

you had an interest, there is another strife that has been in the

South, which is the Lord’s Resistance Army, this terrible situation

where they draw children in and force them to fight. This was part

of this whole counterinsurgency strategy in that this was part of

the government, Khartoum’s, efforts against Uganda. Over the past

couple of years, as the government has taken a new approach, they

have now let the Ugandans cross into Sudanese territory to fight

these guys.

I talked to President Museveni when I was in Rwanda, the President

of Uganda. They are making some headway, but the SPLM,

John Garang’s group, has recommended a three-part effort—SPLM,

Ugandan and Government of Khartoum—to try to further squeeze

the Lord’s Resistance Army. And that is something I pressed for in

Khartoum on my last trip.

I also mentioned to make this work that we have to have set up

the Government of Southern Sudan, and if any of you have been

to Rumbek or the South, you know there is a lot of work to do here.

We sent an interagency assessment team. There has also been a

security team we did with a number of other countries. We started

about $20 million for programs to assist in the formation of this

government. We have some additional money in the 2006 request.

I can’t emphasize enough the importance of showing progress in

the South, pushing both the Government of Sudan and the Southern

forces on the implementation in an inclusive fashion. So, yes,

we have the South and Khartoum in agreement. But, as I mentioned,

you have other groups—fortunately, some of the Northern

tribes just reached an agreement to be included. But the strife I

read about, the report of today from the East, this is probably a

signal of other groups that are not included. So we have to press

both parties to try to make this as inclusive as possible.

We are pressing very hard to keep this on track, including the

formation of the Government of National Unity by July 9; and then

we are going to have to work through a very challenging transition

where, again, we have some aid support as we try to transform the

nature of this government. That we hope will create the conditions

for a safe and voluntary return of displaced Sudanese.

So keep in mind there is about 2 million Sudanese from the

South that are located around Khartoum in IDP camps. Then all

this has to be backed by new policies at the national, local and provincial

level, security and community level, conflict resolution, economic

development, health and education. I mentioned this partly

going back to the history, because local government has been the

key to Sudanese success when it has occurred. So in this structure

one also has, with our aid and our political efforts, to try to maintain

and build local capabilities within a Federal structure that is

being created under the CPA.

So, in summary, we have to work with Sudan on multiple transitions:

From war to peace; centralization to genuine federalism and

devolution of power; emergency needs from food to a development

strategy; and military rule to democracy.

As I mentioned, you have upward and downward spiral potentials

here. And a sensitive point, but one I will identify for you, is

that for all work done on the North-South Accord, and when I have

gone I have tried to emphasize this to the parties, that our ability

to help on the North-South Accord depends critically on a solution

to Darfur. Some people are sensitive to this. They don’t want to

give up the North-South Accord for Darfur, at least that is my

view. And the sense that I picked up from many of you is that you

have to solve both together and you have to solve all the country’s

problems together.

In the course of this, there is obviously a complex amount of multilateral

diplomacy, starting with our African partners. Obviously,

the UN Special Representative Jan Pronk is a good person there.

I have had a chance to work with him on a number of issues. Arab

states, Britain, and Canada have put in forces.

I talked to my friend, Pierre Pettigrew, Canadian Foreign Minister,

formerly the trade minister, because they want to make a

special effort, and they are being coordinated in this.

Norwegians have done an important job, the Dutch, and, of

course, NATO and the EU.

As I mentioned, I have been to Sudan twice, to Khartoum,

Darfur twice, different parts, Rumbek. I may return for this July

9th creation of the Government of National Unity. It is part of how

one tries to use the diplomatic aspects to kind of press people

across the line.

But we obviously are going to need congressional support and resources.

So I had a chance to talk to Mr. Blumenauer a little bit

before, and would be pleased to work with the Committee and others

about visits to help reinforce the message to all parties because

we know this is not going to be a smooth or clear-cut path.

I have raced through this, but you can see there is a tremendous

amount of complexity here. Even the North-South Accord, if you

look through all its implementation provisions, it is an enormous

achievement. But it has to be implemented, and that is where we

have a lot of work to do together.

Just to show what you have also got here, I added a couple of

sort of maps to give you a little feel. The map on page 17 is the

expansion of the AU forces. So the current camps are in red. The

blue ones are the expansion that you will have. So this is a sort

of a picture of the Darfur area.

On page 18, you have a small sort of map for Southern Sudan,

the peacekeeping forces. So here you see you don’t just have African

countries, because this is a UN peacekeeping mission divided

into six sectors.

On page 19, I just tried to give you a little summary of the

United States assistance to Sudan. We include Chad because we

have some 200,000 refugees in Chad on this, divided into the

Darfur/Chad and the other Sudan. I note on the bottom there that

this does not count the UN peacekeeping for Sudan, which goes to

supply the funds for the North-South Accord. With that you had

over $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2005, estimated over $800 million in

fiscal year 2006. You will see that it is an estimate.

One of the reasons why I couldn’t just put our budget request in

here is that big parts of this is food aid; and the way that food aid

is requested, as many of you know, it is a general account and then

we have to sort of try to allocate it. But this tries to give you some

sense of that.

On page 20—I won’t go into all the details for this but, knowing

the interest, I thought you might want to have it. I tried to divide

it so you can see how the aid is broken down: First for Darfur and

Chad with the humanitarian side, fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year

2006. Then, you see the next chart is the nonhumanitarian aid for

Darfur and Chad. Then the following one takes Sudan, non-Darfur,

gives you a sense of humanitarian numbers; and the last one gives

you a sense of nonhumanitarian aid.

So this is heavily the reconstruction. So this last chart gives you

a better sense of some of the efforts to build the implementation

of the North-South Accord.

So, Mr. Chairman, I apologize for going on a little bit, but I know

the interest and would be happy to take any of the questions.

Well, thank you very much, Mr. Lantos; and

thank you for the kind words and the support you have given me

and the Secretary over the years. I appreciate it.

First, the AU’s roll is particularly important here, so I don’t want

to skip over this. It is particularly important in dealing with the

problems of Darfur and Sudan but also important in terms of Africa

in general. I wish it weren’t so, but this may not be the last one

of these. So one point I want to draw attention to is that many of

you dealt with this under the old OAU form, and the OAU was created

a couple of years ago.

The Africans are making a very strong effort to try to develop capabilities

on the military side as well as the mediation side. And

those are the core, the catalysts that we needed to work with in

this process. I have had a chance—I know many of you had a

chance—to visit the soldiers, the Nigerian general in command, the

others that back them from Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal, others. So

where at all possible, Mr. Lantos, we want to try to make it work for them.

And that goes, I guess, to the second point. You suggested it is

going to take a long time. I hope not, and we will see over time.

I believe it need not.

In other words, one of the reasons I was out there again and the

Secretary stressed with a number of the AU political officials—and

obviously this goes to member states, Rwanda, Nigeria and others—

is that I believe we should start to get those forces in during

July and starting in early July. Frankly, we are pressing to get

them there during the July-August-September period, and that is

one reason why, to show the critical need for support. As I alluded

to, they can’t go in unless we build the facility. So we work with

a group called PAE to build the facilities for them to go.

So I do believe we can expand this mission. Whether we get exactly

the 7,700, I can’t say, but certainly double it and more quickly,

and including the police forces.

Then the question is, how best do we support this? And that does

come back to NATO.

Just to show some of the interconnections, on the first trip that

I took on this post I visited some 13 NATO countries. I came back

to the North Atlantic Council, and I started to get people to think

about this possibility, about the fact that, given the problems in

Sudan and Darfur, that we would want to try to get NATO backing.

And those of you who dealt with NATO issues over the years

know this is actually a pretty tremendous step to be able to get

moving forward.

Of course, there was some tension with the European Union; and

we emphasized, look, we will get help wherever we can. We are not

trying to be just NATO and not European Union. We do believe

that NATO tends to have more of the military planning and logistics

capability in here. So the focus with NATO now has been the

airlift logistics, but, importantly, the operation and planning capacity,

including that of the U.S.

Now that does mean there are some people on the ground, with

the Canadians, United States, British, French, rather small

amounts related to support capacity.

One last aspect, one I think we need to think about with this—

which sort of NATO forces. You know, we didn’t have colonies in

Africa, but the Europeans did. So I think one of the challenges

here, as we have seen in problems like Somalia and elsewhere, is

whether outside non-African forces—to the degree and on the first

order, it may seem like they are expanding security, but that can

degrade very quickly. So that is one more reason why—at least it

is my view—that we ought to try to make the African Union process

work: For their good, for Sudan’s good and for—frankly, the

long-term development of this African capability.

But we will have an ongoing conversation on this. If I am wrong

and we don’t get the forces in, then we have to talk.

I tell you honestly, Mr. Lantos, it would be a big challenge to get

NATO to agree to put large-scale ‘‘boots on the ground’’ effort; and

I think it could end up creating a different conflict in Africa. I am

not sure how the Africans would react to this as well. That is why,

as I tried to emphasize here, I think we have something moving,

and at least my goal is to try to get it moving as quickly as possible

to see if we can upgrade the amount of security forces and police.

Congressman Payne, I think you have a number

of comments and questions in there; and I would like to try to address

them since others have been raised.

Let me start on the deaths, because I know this has been reported.

It’s probably of interest to many of you. I don’t know how

many people have died in Darfur. I don’t know of anybody who does.

I will explain what I did.

And it is actually kind of interesting in light of what you said.

I was asked by a reporter, ‘‘Does the State Department have an

estimate?’’ And rather than dissemble, rather than hide, I gave

them the estimate of our intelligence and research office, which is

now the explanation that is put on the Web site. And I explained

the range estimate, the period, and the covering sort of additional deaths.

I will point out that the World Health Organization, from which

a lot of this is drawn, also did a collaborating—the Center for Re-

search on Epidemiology released a 42-page document about Darfur

counting the deaths and mortality estimates for multiple survey

data. And their numbers are about the same as the numbers that

came out of our intelligence and research. The UN numbers are

pretty close, and they haven’t even explained the origin.

Now you do have one estimate that has come from a group of

about a 400,000 range, and that is based on an extrapolation from

two sources, including some research that was funded by USAID,

that tried to take the highest levels of violence and disease and

uniformly apply them over a 26-month period, suggesting there

was no change over this period.

Now I will add, Mr. Payne, when I mentioned to the reporters,

I said, ‘‘I don’t know what the numbers are. There are higher-range estimates.’’

It is actually kind of interesting. I was doing what, sometimes,

the Congress urges U.S. officials to do, to be honest about their reports,

explain the logic, explain the estimates; and then some people

find that wrong. Well, to be honest, we want to have a truthful

exchange. I am explaining to you what I know, the basis of the

numbers. It is on the Web site. It is based by a series of studies.

But, you know, people can draw their own estimates. But I frankly

don’t think that is a point to be criticized for.

Second, on genocide—and, again, I am glad you raised this because

it is important to clarify it. Because I think, and this is

where you and I probably have a very strong agreement, there is

very intense feeling out there in the country on this. I have talked

to Jewish groups, Evangelical Christian groups, African American

groups, which you and I are both encountering. So people want to

know that their Government, the Executive Branch as well as the

Congress, is intensely involved in this. I am trying to explain during

the course of this—and people can criticize, make suggestions

on how we do it. I don’t mean to presume we have all the solutions.

But on the genocide point, you are exactly right. Secretary Powell

talked about it being genocide. The President talked about it being

genocide. I talked about it being genocide when I was in Darfur

with the Sudanese officials around.

However, the report that you are picking up was, again, another

explanation where what I pointed out to some reporters was that

after the United States found it was genocide, we urged the UN to

do an investigation. The UN did an investigation. They came up—

and this goes back to some of the points Mr. Leach mentioned—

with crimes against humanity.

I don’t think crimes against humanity is a mild charge. Probably,

indeed the reason you didn’t have genocide at the time of the Nuremberg

trials, was that the term actually was invented afterward

based on that experience. My point is, we find it genocide; the UN

finds it crimes against humanity. Either compels our action.

Now other people that you and I work with—for example, President

Mbeki is cautious about some of this terminology. My point

is, we have got our position. I don’t really think the important

thing is for us to get in a fight with the UN and South Africans.

I want to try to work the problem. So no difference in terms of the

findings, and I appreciate Mr. Leach’s point about what that signals

in terms of overall support.

You also asked about the intelligence point, and this is something

I think that Chairman Hyde mentioned as well. I think we

can try to achieve both aims about counterterrorism and sending

a message to the Government in Khartoum, and that is what we

are tying to do.

The cooperation on counterterrorism has been important. It will

continue to be important. But, again, just to give you a sense of

how we try to do this is that, when the intelligence official came

to the United States, we coordinated with the intelligence agencies.

The State Department actually saw the intelligence official, and we

coordinated with our intelligence officials to drive home the message

that counterterrorism cooperation was not enough, that we

had to have action on Darfur and the implementation of the North-

South agreement.

Now let me explain why I think this is very important. There are

different power centers in Khartoum. I mean, none of us know for

sure about all of the relationships. I want the information going

back through every channel of power in that system that we have

to have action on Darfur and Sudan. So it is—you know, it is a

point that I fully understand people’s anxiety that you focus on

counterterrorism, not others. That is not what we are doing. So,

again, I think we have a shared view on that.

On special envoys, again, I know a point that is of symbolic importance

for a lot of people is that—I have been mulling this over—

I have talked about this with the Secretary, about whether we

should appoint a special envoy on top of it. But here is the real

challenge. Right now, I have been serving as the special envoy, and

that has certain advantages for the United States. So I am in the

meeting with the European Union, with the President, and I can

press for food and I can talk to Sulana about this, that and the

other thing. I have a rank around the world from past actions, current

actions; and the Sudanese are aware of that, the Southerners

are aware of that. It actually extends the reach of working on this

problem, and that is one reason I was trying to describe it in some depth.

But you are also right. I have a lot of other things to do. So I

am trying to figure out actually what combination of special representative,

envoy or support—but, again, in the honest spirit that

Mr. Lantos suggested, my caution on this is I don’t want to suggest

actually any lessening of interest. It says something to the world

that, frankly, that I have been doing what I have been doing on

this and I want to keep doing it. So that is the balance that we

need to try to strike. So I am very much open to the idea about

how to try to do that in a way that adds to our overall effectiveness.

Okay, Mr. Smith, I think I got them, but fill me in if I haven’t.

On the mandate, the first one, we can get you the precise language

about protection. In general, at least as I understand it, the

African Union mandate is actually broader than the normal UN

peacekeeping mandate. I am not sure that it covers what could be

the sort of combat operations sort of side, but earlier this year,

when the African Union reviewed its mandate, it came to the conclusion

that it had enough flexibility within the current terminology

that there is not a need to seek additional authority, but

that they should exercise that authority more actively.

We said, by the way, we would always support an extension of

the mandate, but, of course, they are an African force, they are African

boots on the ground. But, in addition, it comes back to what

we have seen is, where the African Union forces are present, it has

a major effect on the violence. Now that is in part because you no

longer have the Government of Sudan and military actions. So this

is where the diplomacy intersects. They no longer have the helicopters

flying. They no longer have the gun ships. So the African

Union is really trying to deal with rebels and Janjaweed militia.

That is where that capability is and under that mandate seems to

be able to handle, and now it is a question of more of them.

So going into your second question, on capacity, there are at least

two elements. One is numbers, and I have described what we are

trying to do to get the numbers up. And the Rwandans are ready.

I have got a set of different countries, if you would want, that have

committed battalions; and the Rwandans are sort of ready to go.

We have actually worked out with our air transports starting to

bring them in July. There are some that have partially committed,

but we don’t have it fully sort of nailed down yet.

But, in addition to the numbers, this is where our sort of financial

support is important. Because we also have to have some communications,

equipment, and others. Because you have a mobility

issue here in being able to cover the camps and being able to get

out quickly to villages and issues that sort of might be at risk.

I will mention, I guess, some possible risk is I know the Committee

took on the peacekeeping fund in a most recent vote. You

know, we took the $50 million for the African Union force from that

peacekeeping fund. So please don’t urge me to do more and then

starve me at the same time. I mean, this is where the two really do come together.

In terms of the—I wrote down the trafficking of persons?

I want to make sure I have this. If it is the—in

general, on trafficking of persons, you know that the Secretary had

Sudan as a tier 3 country again.

Okay, and——

From what I have seen, it is a very professional

group. But it is a good caution and a good warning going forward.

You know, I know you have traveled to lots of different places in

the world. I tried to go out to even some of the Northern camps

with their smaller units. These are impressive people doing a very

difficult job, and so I have had no sign of that, but it is a good caution.

On refugees and return, refugees—as you know, we deal with the

non-internally displaced, so that is the people across the border, for

example, Chad or some in Libya; and I think in Chad there is an

estimate of about 200,000.

I think—again, this is a question that I am not sure any of us

can answer today. One of the worries is will refugees or the internally

displaced people be willing to go home? The sense that I got

from talking to people in Sudan and talking to people who know

Sudan much better than I do is, if the peaceful conditions return,

they do want to go home. These are people very tied to the land.

But it still has some of these issues here that we talked about in

terms of the water and the land rights and sort of others; and that

would include, I believe, you know, the refugees in Chad.

So the goal here again is to keep the conditions where people

want to go home, feel they are safe to go home, have a chance to

rebuild their lives. So we haven’t yet gotten to the question of, well,

what if they don’t, which is the other question I think is inherent in that.

And then, fifth, on the food aid, we are trying to

do a number of things. We are working—and I know you make efforts

on this, too—with the World Food Organization to talk to others.

The European Union—traditionally, we provide about 50 percent

of the food. The European Union normally is a big donor. I

think they got caught in some of their own bureaucratic processes.

So I am modestly hopeful, after the push that we have done over

the past couple days, that they will expedite it. They provide

money to buy the food. We normally provide the food. But it is an

issue that, of course, needs bearing attention. And you can all help

us on this. There is, obviously, the G–8 Summit. Everybody is talking

about concerns for Africa, and I keep saying if Europe is concerned

about Africa, help us get some food to these people.

Okay, let me start with the last one, because it

actually connects to Mr. Payne’s a little bit in that this is a balance,

frankly, of sort of time and level, because I work on other

Egyptian issues, including some on the economic side and the democracy

side. I have actually raised with the Prime Minister of

Egypt and others when he was here about the importance of being

able to come back to them and work with them on some of these

exact concerns to send the right message.

Egypt has tended to play a constructive role related to some of

the reconciliation that has been done in the North. There was a recent

sort of agreement on this. But I agree with your general point,

that I think the sort of recognition across the Arab world about the

genocide in Darfur has not been as great as one would like it to be.

Just to take that a step further, it is also—again, where you can

interconnect these pieces—when I was in Jordan and talking with

King Abdullah, who also has some ties with the Government in

Sudan but has been a very good friend of the United States, again,

I was starting to make the point that I may need him at times to

make pressure on some of these players.

Libya plays a role, as al-Ghadafi has tried to play a role. It is

a little uncertain as to whether now it is trying to reach peace or

just add to their influence in the process.

So you know, each country is varied; and we are trying to work

with those players in addition to trying to work with the African

countries as part of creating the right context for the program that

I have outlined here.

Taking it in reverse order, in lifting sanctions, I don’t know

where that has come from. We have not had any sort of plans to lift sanctions.

Now, one thing is you have this Government of National Unity,

and depending on what their actions are over time—John Garang

is part of this government. That is something that, of course, we

may or may not get to the point where we discuss with players,

with the Congress and others, but that requires major change of

actions along the way. It requires a change of the government according

to the overall strategy. But we don’t have any plans to lift sanctions.

I will add, there are about five or six different types of sanctions,

okay? So one that does get discussed is that there is a—about their

position in terms of cooperation and terrorism, and there is a—I

forgot the right term. They are classified as having not been coop-

erative to terrorism. Frankly, they have been cooperating on terrorism.

But even if that one were changed, you would still have the

series of others that wouldn’t allow the types of economic interaction.

Then on the peacemaking question—and, again, I don’t mean to

split terms here, but I am going to try to answer what I think—

the focus on peacemaking in that term of art tends to be more of

a sort of a military action, and I think what you are focusing on

would be more the kind of enforcement or peacekeeping-type of operations.

But if I am wrong, correct me, and——

Okay. On that, I do think, Congresswoman, there

would be sensitivities on the African side on this; and that is what

I was trying to answer to Mr. Lantos’ question.

The African Union has taken this as a belief that Africa needs

to empower itself to deal with Africa’s problems, of course with the

support of others. So we have—and this is one of the things that

Secretary Rice is personally engaged in. We talked to President

Konare, the former President of Mali, who is now head of the African

Union, about making sure they would be comfortable with the

NATO support presence. But I do think there would be a difficulty with that.

And there would also be the problem—I think it was Mr. Lantos’

question I mentioned—is that if you had the American or western

European troops, I honestly don’t know what this could trigger

with some of the dangerous people you have there. I am thinking

here of the Somalian incident. I think we all agree you have got

some bloodthirsty, cold-hearted killers here. How do they use some

of these things against the purpose?

So if we can make the African Union forces work, that is the best

of all. Then they can’t say, ‘‘Oh, it is the United States, or the British

or the colonial powers, that are telling Sudan what to do. By

the way, let’s bring in new terrorist killers to go after them.’’ So

that is why the focus has been on trying to get the African Union forces to work.

But we have—to complete this, we have discussed with DoD and

others about the type of support and logistics. And sometimes—

when I was in Darfur the first time, I was taken around by a Lieutenant

Colonel Ron Capps, who is the Foreign Service Officer who

was called up as a reservist. He was with me in the Darfur camps,

and he is now back on a rotation in the United States, I hope to

see him this week. So we did have some forces there.

Sorry.

I was thinking the same thing.

I don’t. If I learn of any, I will get back to you on it.

The section that you mentioned I looked at too;

and I know of the amendment that you had proposed to this.

If I could, Mr. Tancredo——

If I could, Mr. Tancredo, I also want to make sure

our lawyers talk to your staff. When I read the amendment once,

I was worried it might accidently limit us in one way, which I know

is not your purpose. So if we could have a little freedom to follow

up with you, but the purpose is the same.

Well, they may do better.

I do not know of any. Chairman Wolf, who as we

know has a strong interest in these issues, brought to my attention

a report—I think it was actually also covered in the *Washington*

*Times* recently. We brought—some FBI and intelligence people met

with the people that had the report. He was kind enough to invite

some of the people from the State Department there as well.

They are obviously pursuing it, because of the history that you

mention. We do not have any verification of that, you know, at this

time, but it is something that one needs to continue to pursue.

Thank you, Chairman.